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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MARY

~1.

STROUD,

Appellant,
-vs.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, and
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a municipal corporation,

Case No. 7687

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to the facts as set forth in the brief of
Appellant, I feel that it will be beneficial to the review
of this matter to set forth in addition thereto the following facts which I feel are important to Respondent's
position:
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There is no dispute that THO~fAS WILLIAM
STROUD was in the employ of SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION as a police officer up to and prior to
January 5, 1951 (R. 6). Officer JAMES C. McGARRY
had eight (8) cases of soda water in his car, and he and
STROUD were transferring them from the McGARRY
car to the STROUD car. That McGARRY did not see the
gun discharge or know how it happened-(R. 11), nor
did MeGARRY or anyone else hear or see the gun fall,
if in fact it did fall (R. 11), nor did McGARRY or anyone else see the gun or any gun on the person of
STROUD before he heard a shot (R. 11).
The gun McGARRY saw on the sidewalk was not
issued by the SALT LAKE CITY Police Department
(R. 12-27). The car STROUD was using was his own
personal car ( R. 12), and the soda water was to be taken
to a Ward House to be used at a square dance the night
of January 5, 1951, which dance was purely a social
function to be attended by police officers and their wives
(R. 12) and had nothing to do with the Police Department as such, and was not a required function (R. 13).
At the time of the shot, STROUD was dressed in civilian
clothes (R. 13) and it was his day off (R. 13, 14, 19, 32,
33). The car to be checked out by STROUD was checked
out by Acting Sergeant BRINTON (R. 19, 36). Police
officers, while off duty, are not required to carry guns,
either by order of the Chief or by the Rules and Regulations of the Police Department or the Rules and Regulations of the Civil Service Commission (R. 21, 24, 26),
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and an officer would not be reprilnanded if he did not
carry a gun while off duty (R. 26). ELl\1:ER E. BRINTOX was ~-\rting Sergeant of the shift on January 5,
1951 (R. 3~). Only the ~-\rting Sergeant's orders would be
carried out (R. 36).
It was agreed by counsel for Appellant, SALT
LAKE CITY CORPORATION, and the INDUSTRIAL
CO~LJIISSIOX (R. 6) that the only issue involved in this
matter is whether the accident which caused the death
of THOMAS WILLIAl\f STROUD arose out of or in
the course of his employment while employed by SALT

LAKE CITY CORPORATION as is· provided by Section 42-1-43, U.C.A., 1943.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

I.
COURT'S POWER IS LIMITED IN REVIEWING DECISIONS OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION UNDER THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.

II.
THE DEATH OF STROUD DID NOT ARISE OUT OF
HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION.

III.
ACCIDENTS THAT DO NOT ARISE OUT OF OR DURING THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT COMPENSABLE EVEN THOUGH EMPLOYEE IS SUBJECT TO CALL
24 HOURS A DAY.
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IV.
NECESSARY TO BE COMPLYING WITH AN ORDER
OR RULE OF EMPLOYER.

v.
STROUD WAS NOT IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
COURT'S POWER IS LIMITED IN REVIEWING DECISIONS OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION UNDER THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.

The Utah Supreme Court has, on occasions too
numerous to mention, held that in a proceeding to review
a decision of the Industrial Commission under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Court will examine into the
evidence only to determine whether there is any substantial competent evidence to support the finding of
the Commission, and, if there is in fact such evidence,
the findings will be sustained even though the Commission could have found either way on the issue.
We shall cite a few of the authorities to illustrate
the proposition stated under Point I.

Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial Com·
mission of Utah, 193 P. 642;
Twin Peaks Canning Company v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 196 P. 854;
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R1tkazciua l'. ludw·;frial Commission of Utah,
2-!S P. 1103:
Banks v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 278
P. 58.
POINT II.
THE DEATH OF STROUD DID NOT ARISE OUT OF
HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION.

The findings of the Industrial Commission in this
decision are all sustained by competent substantial evidence given at the ti1ne of the hearing and which, for the
purpose of this particular argument, are as follows:
That :JicG~-\.RRY and STROUD had accepted the
responsibility of furnishing refreshments for a square
dance to be attended by police officers and their wives,
which was a purely social function and had nothing to do
with the Police Department, nor was it a required police
activity. STROUD was using his personal car to transport the soda water to the Ward House where such dance
was to be held. MeGARRY did not, at any time, see the
gun involved on STROUD'S person on January 5, 1951.
He heard a shot and turned to see a gun on the pavement. No-one saw the shot fired and there is no testimony that a bullet from this gun caused the death of
STROUD. January 5, 1951, was STROUD'S day off.
He came to the station to meet MeG ARRY and transfer
soda water to his car. Other persons could check out
cars, and in this case Acting Sergeant BRINTON did
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check out the car referred to. All officers do not carry
guns on days off, and no Rule or Regulation of the Police
Department or Civil Service Commission or order of
the Department required the carrying of a gun on one's
day off or while not on duty as a police officer.
Appellant cites many cases, a number of which are
not in point here or which are distinguishable, particularly those cases which involved an accident resulting
in injuries to an employee while going to or from work.
Utah follows the majority rule that where an employee
is injured going to and from work at the special direction
or request of the employer, he is entitled to compensation. In this case STROUD was not going to or from
work at the request of the Police Department, nor was
he engaged in any endeavor which promoted the interest
of his employer. To the contrary, he was off duty and on
a mission of his own.
The case closest in point cited by Appellant is the
case of Beaver City v. Industrial Commissiort of Utah,
67 Utah~' 245 P. 378. The facts of this case are entirely
different and distinguishable from this case. In the

Beaver City case, supra, the Court found:
"The accident occurred between the regular
hours of the marshal* * *"- p. 379.
and he had gone home to clean his gun as he had no
office or other convenient place to clean the gun, and the
Court stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
.. IIad the n1arshal undertaken to clean the
gun at the ditch and at the time it dropped out of
his pocket, and in doing so then was injured by
an accidental discharge of the gun, we think it
could not sueeessfully be contended that the injury did not arise out of or in the course of his
en1ploYJnent. And we think it would have made
no difference had he gone to the city hall (if
Beaver City had a hall) or to some other convenient place, and had there attempted to clean
the gun. Having no Inaterial with him with which
to clean the gun, and there being no convenient
place to clean it, he went to his house. He still
was on duty and within the corporate limits over
which his duties extended, and, though in his own
house, yet in a sense on the premises of his employer, and, so far as made to appear, there exposed to no more danger in cleaning the gun than
had he undertaken to clean it at the ditch or at
some other place. We thus do not see wherein,
in cleaning the gun at his house, the officer was
any less in the course of his employment than if
he had undertaken to clean it at some other place.
It further is made to appear that cleaning the
gun at his house was not a place chosen or selected by him as a mere personal convenience or
accommodation, but rather one of necessity; there
being no other place where he conveniently could
have cleaned it. Thus, under the circumstances,
we think the award was proper."
In the case of Mayor v. Ward, 114 S.W. 2d, 804,
cited by Appellant, the Court found that the injured
policeman was, at the time of the accident, still under
all of the obligations of his employment, in his uniform,
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and carrying his badge and weapons of office. He also
followed up, further, and arrested the drunk driver that
hit him on the same night it happened.
All of the other cases cited by Appellant are third
party cases or cases in which the injured were actually
in the course of their employment while on duty when
the injury occurred and are certainly not in point here.
Could it be argued that a policeman would be entitled to compensation from an injury received from a
gun accident while he was employed as a special officer
by a department store on his day off, or during nonworking hours; or, during a hike in the mountains with
his friends or family on his day off or during non-working hours; or, if he was injured by his gun falling from
his dresser to the floor while he was either dressing or
un-dressing while at home on his day off or during nonworking

hours~

I do not believe that counsel for Appel-

lant would argue that Appellant would be entitled to any
relief under the above mentioned instances.
It must be remembered that STROUD was not called
back to work. He was on a mission of his own, which
in no way would benefit his employer. He was under
no order, Rule or Regulation to carry a gun on off-duty
hours. There is absolutely no evidence to show any
causal connection between the injury and his employment or that the same arose out of his employment. The
gun was not seen on his person prior to the shooting, and
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no-one saw the shot fired, and there is no testimony to
show that a bullet from the gun found on the pavement
on the sidewalk caused the injury.
~Iany

persons carry firearms, and the carrying of
firearms has neYer been considered inherently dangerous. Accidents from firearms result in most every case
from the carelessness on the part of the handler. In the
case of Roberts v. City of Colfax, 260 N.W. 57, the Night
:Jiarshal of the City, while engaged in cleaning up the
floor of the city jail, was injured when a revolver which
he was carr:~ing fell from his pocket and was discharged,
and the Court held:
"that the loss of eye caused by discharge of night
marshal's revolver which fell from his pocket
while marshal was cleaning floor of jail was not
compensable as the carrying of firearms by peace
officers was not a peril or hazard peculiar to the
work of their office."
In the case of Kresl v. Village of Dodge, 238 N.W.
752, the wife of the village marshal heard a shot from
the bedroom where her husband was changing clothes

prior to going on duty as the village marshal at about
6:00 o'clock in the evening. On going to the room, she
found her husband dead and his revolver lying on the
floor. The revolver had a bad history, it having gone
off accidentally on prior occasions. The Court held that
this was not an accident arising out of employment and
denied compensation.
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In the case of Albers v. Kipp, 263 N.W. 593, the
Court held that an injury to an employee does not "arise
out of the employment" within Workmen's Compensation
Law where, without employer's knowledge or direction,
employee is voluntarily performing work not contemplated by employment contract, in a place where his
duties do not require his presence, and with appliance
not furnished by employer and used without employer's
knowledge or consent, notwithstanding work may have
been beneficial to employer.
In the case of Harvey v. Caddo DeSoto Cotton Oil
Company, 6 So. 2d 747, the rule is established for the
common accident test as to whether an accident arose
out of the employment, the Court stating:
"That it is only necessary to consider two
points: (1) Was the employee then engaged about
his employer's business and not merely pursuing
his own business or pleasure, and ( 2) Did the
necessities of the employer's business reasonably
require that the employee be at the place of the
accident at the time the accident occurred."
In the case of Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, 158 P. 2d 511, the Court, in deciding the
question of whether the accident arose out of employment, laid down the rule that an employer is not an insurer and that if the accident occurs while the employee
is engaged in some act having no relation to his duties
for his own comfort or otherwise, or has abandoned his
occupation even temporarily, then injury does not arise
out of employment.
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In the case of Roberts and Oake v. Industrial Commission, et al, 39 N.E. ~d 315, the Court held:
"That in order for a risk to be incidental to
the en1ployment within Compensation Act it must
have a relation to the work performed by the
employee in fulfilling his contract of service, and
that where an employee assumes to undertake a
dangerous act which is altogether outside of his
scope of employment, the risk taken is not incidental to the employment."
POINT III.
ACCIDENTS THAT DO NOT ARISE OUT OF OR DURING THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT COMPENSABLE EVEN THOUGH EMPLOYEE IS SUBJECT TO CALL
24 HOURS A DAY.

Appellant contends most strongly that because
STROUD was subject to call 24 hours a day, he was
entitled to compensation for his injury. Many cases have
been decided on this point, all of which hold that unless
the employee was actually in the course of his employment or that the accident arose out of his employment,
the same is not compensable. In the case of Sullivan v.
Industrial Commission, 10 P. 2d 924, a Utah case where
:Mr. Sullivan was subject to call 24 hours a day, stopped
over enroute to New York to visit his daughter at Vassar
College, and while there with his daughter, was injured,
the Court held:
"Though an employee is by the terms of his
employment required to be ready to perform his
duties for the employer at any hour of the day
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or night, it does not follow that every accident or
injury that he may receive during the course of
the 24 hours arises out of his employment. To be
compensable, it must appear that at the time of
the injury he was discharging some of the duties
he is employed to perform or that what he is doing
is in some way connected with or incidental to
the duty owing to the master."
In the case of Mitchell v. Ball Bros. Co., 186 N.E.
900, the Court held that the death of an employee struck

by an automobile while on way to employer's premises
from lunch without any special call, did not arise out
of and in the course of employment, although employee
was subject to call at any time during the day.
Also, see State Young Men's Christian Association

v. Industrial Commission, 292 N.W. 324.
POINT IV.
NECESSARY TO BE COMPLYING WITH AN ORDER
OR RULE OF EMPLOYER.
In reply to the cases cited by Appellant to sustain
his contention that it is immaterial that employer did
not order STROUD to carry a gun, I call the Coru:Fs
attention to the fact that in every case so cited and that
in all the cases I was able to find where compensation
was allowed, the injury resulted during the working
hours of the injured employee's employment and further
resulted in the actual course of employment.
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POINT V.
STROUD WAS NOT IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.

Stroud was off duty, and was transferring cases
of soda water from one car to his car when injured. In
the case of Vitagraph, Inc., v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 85 P. 2d 601, the question arose as to whether the
accident arose out of or in the course of employment,
and the Court therein established the rule that for an
injury to be compensable, the workman must at the time of
the injury have been engaged in doing some work for the
employer or under the direction and control of the employer, or at the point of danger pursuant to or in carrying out the order or direction of the employer, or in
doing some act necessary to be done for the employment
or incidental thereto and not detachable therefrom.
In the case of State Young Men's Christian Asso-

ciation v. Industrial Commission, supra, 292 N.W. 324,
the evidence showed that the injured employee was employed to render medical service with the understanding
that he would live on the premises and respond to all
emergency calls. That while playing tennis on the employer's premises he received an eye injury, and the
Court held:
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"That the exercise of his privilege to join in
a game of tennis with other employees who were
also indulging in the pleasure, did not result in
service to the employer. He and his companions
were free to use their time to suit themselves. It
was while playing in this manner that the injured
was struck in the eye with a tennis ball. At the
time he was exercising a personal privilege apart
from any interest of the employer, the nature of
which cannot be considered as being for the benefit of the employer or for the mutual benefit of
both. His play was without direction or compulsion of any kind which required him to take part,
and no duty was imposed on him nor would he be
discharged for failure to participate."
In the case of Tabor v. Midland Flour Milling Co.,
168 S.W. 2d, 458, the Court sets down the commonly accepted rule of "in course of employment" wherein the
Court held:
"An injury to an employee arises in course
of employment when it occurs within the period
of his employment at a place where he might
reasonably he and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in
the performance of some task incidental thereto.
But where, at the time of his injury, the employee
is engaged in a voluntary act not known to or accepted by his employer and outside the duties for
which he is employed, the injury is not received
in the course of employment."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
CONCLUSION
That the Industrial Commision did not err in concluding that the accident which caused the death of
THO~L\S \YILLIA~l STROUD did not arise out of or
in the course of his emploYJ.nent by Defendant SALT
LAKE CITY CORPORATION and in denying the claim
of ~IARY ~I. STROUD for compensation.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CHRISTENSEN,
City Attorney
HOMER HOLMGREN,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Assistant City Attorneys,
Attorneys for Respondent.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
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........................copies of the foregoing brief received this
........................ day of July, 1951.

Attorney for Appellant
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